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used or operated .. for profit regardless of the purposes 
to which the profit is devoted." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 214, 
subd. (3).) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, 
J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 11, 
1952. 
[Crim. No. 5282. In Bank. May 19, 1952.] 
In re Troy M. Levi, on Behalf of EDDIE D. LEVI, on 
Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Criminal Law-Probation-Revocation.-There is neither a 
constitutional nor a statutory right to a hearing preceding 
revocation of probation. 
[2] Id.-Probation-Revocation.-A hearing preceding revocation I 
of probation, if held, is not governed by the rules concerning 
formal criminal trials. 
[8] Id.-Probation-Revocation.-Probation may be revoked solely 
on the basis of the probation officer's report; there is no right 
to present witnesses. 
[4] Id.-Probation-Revocation.-Constitutional right of accused 
to have counsel in "criminal prosecutions" (Const., art. I, 
§ 13) is not applicable to a hearing preceding revocation of 
probation, since a probation proceeding is not part of a 
"prosecution." 
[6] Id.-Judgment-Presence of Defendant.-Judgment and sen-
tence in felony cases may ordinarily be imposed only in the 
presence of the accused. 
[1] Right to notice and hearing before revocation of suspension 
of sentence, parole or conditional pardon, notes, 54 A.L.R. 1471; 
132 A.L.R.1248. See, also, Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 414; Am.Jur., 
Criminal Law, § 498. 
[5] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 479; Am.Jur., Criminal Law; 
§455. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Criminal Law, § 991; [5,6] Crimi-
nal Law, §1005; [7,8,10] Criminal Law, §1006; [9] Habeas Cor-f pus, § 34; [ill Bah... C""'''', 168; [12] CrimU>aI Law, § 9SO. 
r 
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[6] Id.-Judgment-Presence of Defendant.-If judgment is pro-
nounced in the accused's absence, and no justifying circum-
stances are shown, the judgment must be set aside. 
[7] Id.-Judgment-Arraignment of Defendant for Judgment.-
A defendant has substantial rights at the time he is arraigned 
for judgment, because he may be able to show good cause 
why the judgment should not be pronounced against him (Pen. 
Code, §§ 1200, 1201), .and if judgment is pronounced in his 
absence he is deprived of these rights. 
[8] Id.-Judgment-Arraignment of Defendant for Judgment.-
An arraignment for judgment is a "criminal prosecution" 
within the meaning of Const., art. I, § 13, and an accused 
therefore has the right to counsel at the time of pronouncement 
of judgment. 
[9] Habeas Corpus-Grounds for Relief-Judgment.-A judgment 
pronounced against the accused in the absence of counsel is 
vulnerable to attack by habeas corpus. 
[10] Criminal Law - Judgment - Arraignment of Defendant for 
Judgment.-Where the trial court, at the time defendant was 
arraigned for judgment, did not inform him of his right to 
counsel, did not ask him if he had any legal cause to show 
why judgment should not be pronounced against him, and 
made no attempt to ascertain if he understood the pleas and 
defenses available under Pen. Code, § 1201, and where the 
report of the probation officer shows that defendant has only 
a fifth grade education and is of "dull mentality," his failure 
to request counsel cannot be amplified into a waiver of his 
right to counsel. 
[lla, llb] Habeas Corpus-Judgment-Discharge and Remand.-
Error in pronouncement of judgment against an accused who 
was not represented by counsel at that time does not require 
either his release on habeas corpus or a new trial, and he may 
be committed to the custody of the sheriff with directions 
that he be arraigned for pronouncement of a valid judgment. 
[12] Criminal Law-Judgment-Time to Pronounce.-Delay in 
failure to pronounce a valid judgment against defendant since 
revocation of probation is not jurisdictional, and his confine-
ment on an invalid judgment will, on pronouncement of a 
valid judgment, be credited on the new commitment. (Pen. 
Code, § 2900.1.) 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ granted. 
[11J See Ca1.Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 56; Am.Jur., Habeas Cor-
pus, § 154. 
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David A. Fall for Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Winslow Christian, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Troy Levi seeks a writ of habeas corpus 
on behalf of his brother, Eddie Levi, an inmate of the Cali-
fornia Institution for Men at Chino. Eddie Levi, hereinafter 
referred to as petitioner, was committed for the offense of 
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily 
harm. (Pen. Code, § 245.) He contends that his deten-
tion is unauthorized because his constitutional rights were 
violated in proceedings leading to his confinement. 
He was arrested in June, 1950, after inflicting severe 
wounds on one Everett Sykes with a pocket knife. The cause 
was submitted on the transcript of the preliminary hearing 
and the trial court, sitting without a jury, found him guilty 
of assault with intent to commit murder. On September 27, 
1950, after hearing his application for probation and motion 
for a new trial, the court denied his motion for a new trial, 
reduced the offense to assault by means of force likely to pro-
duce great bodily harm, ordered that proceedings be sus-
pended, and placed him on probation for five years on con-
dition that he serve one year in the county jail c, with good 
time allowed." Approximately five days after his release from 
the county jail, he was arrested for intoxication and sentenced 
to four days in jail. The probation officer filed a report that 
he was not a suitable subject for probation and should be 
sentenced to prison. On September 5, 1951, the court revoked 
probation and pronounced judgment. Petitioner was sen-
tenced to the state prison for the term prescribed by law for 
the offense of an assault by means of force likely to produce 
great bodily harm. The entire transcript of the proceedings 
on September 5th is set out in the footnote.· 
*Los Angeles, California, Wednesday, September 5, 1951, 10 :52 a. m. 
On the above date the defendant appeared in court In Propria Per-
sona; the People being represented by William O. Russell, Deputy 
District Attorney of Los Angeles County; and also present, B. E. 
McEveety. Deputy Probation Officer; the following proceedings were 
had. to wit: 
(August .r. Goebel, Reporter.) 
THE COUR.T: People v. Eddie D. Levi. 
Mr. Levi, they tell me you have had some more trouble since you 
were out. 
TRE DEFENDANT: I went to Pedro to my brother's-
) 
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Petitioner contends that his confinement is illegal on the 
grounds that he did not receive notice of the hearing preced-
ing revocation of probation, that he was not represented by 
counsel at the hearing, and that he was not given the oppor-
tunity to summon witnesses in his behalf. Petitioner does 
not thereby show grounds for issuance of habeas corpus. 
[1] There is neither a constitutional nor a statutory right 
to a hearing preceding revocation of probation. (In re Davis, 
37 Ca1.2d 872, 873-874 [236 P.2d 579].) [2] If a hearing 
is held, it is not governed by the rules concerning formal crimi-
nal trials. [3] The court may revoke probation solely on the 
basis of the probation officer's report. (In re Dearo, 96 Cal. 
App.2d 141,143 [214 P.2d 585].) There is no right to present 
witnesses. (People v. Hayden, 99 Cal.App.2d 97, 99 [221 P. 
2d 221].) [4] The constitutional right to have counsel in 
"criminal prosecutions" (art. I, § 13) is not applicable since 
a probation proceeding is not part of a "prosecution." (In 
re Dearo, supra, 96 Cal.App.2d 141, 143; People v. Fields, 
88 Cal.App.2d 30, 33 [198 P.2d 104].) 
Although the foregoing contentions are without merit, the 
record discloses a serious defect in the proceedings in the 
trial court. It will be recalled that this case is not one in 
which judgment was pronounced and execution of sentence 
suspended during probation. (Of. In re Davis, supra; People 
v. Blankenship, 16 Cal.App.2d 606 [61 P.2d 352].) Instead, 
sentence and judgment were never imposed until the date of 
revocation of probation. The record shows that petitioner was 
not represented by counsel at that time, although the Consti-
tution provides that "in criminal prosecutions, in any court 
whatever, the party accused shall have the right ... to appear 
THE COURT: You got into some sort of a drunken brawlf 
THE DEFENDANT: No. They say I was drunk. 
THE COURT: Yes. Your wife has never come out here and your chilo 
dren are still back in Chicago, is that correcU 
THE DEFENDANT: Sure. 
THE CoURT: Well, because of the serious nature of your offense and 
because the Court specifically admonished you that you were not under 
any circumstances to use intoxicating liquor and because you rewarded 
the consideration that was given you by going out and getting drunk 
within five days after yonr release, your probation is revoked. 
It is the judgment and sentence of the Court that for t.he offense of 
Assault By Means of Forre Likely To Produce Great Bodily Harm, 
that you be now confined in the state prison for the term prescribed 
by law. 
You are remanded into the custody of the Sheriff to be by him deliv· 
ered into the. custody of the Department of Corrections to serve the 
sentence. 
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and defend, in person and with counsel." (Art. I, § 13.) 
The question thus arises whether the fact that petitioner was 
not represented by counsel at the time of pronouncement of 
judgment requires that the jUdgment be set aside on habeas 
corpus. 
[5] With certain exceptions not applicable here (see In 
re Ralph, 27 Cal.2d 866, 872 [168 P.2d 1] [sentence following I 
decision on appeal] ; People v. Brown, 102 Cal.App.2d 60, 62-
63 [226 P.2d 609] [sentence after exercising reasonable dili-
gence to procure missing defendant and finding that it is in 
interest of justice to pronounce judgment in his absence] ; 
People v. Weinstein, 298 Ill. 264, 268 [131 N.E. 631 [accused 
, absconded after verdict] ),judgment and sentence in felony 
cases may be imposed only in the presence of the accused. 
[6] If judgment is pronounced in his absence, and no justi-
fying circumstances are shown, the judgment must be set 
aside. (People v. Brown, supra; People v. Fields, 88 Cal.App. 
2d 30, 33 [198 P.2d 104] ; In re Klein, 75 Cal.App.2d 600, 
603 [171 P.2d 471] j People v. Hawthorne, 63 Cal.App.2d 262, 
264 [146 P.2d 517] j see People v. Williams, 24 Cal.2d 848, 
853 [151 P.2d 244] j Staples v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 583, 
587 [125 S.E. 319] j Siegel v. State, 201 Wis. 12, 17 [229 N.W. 
44] j cases collected in 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1574.) 
;, 
[7] A defendant has substantial rights at the time he is 
arraigned for judgment, because he may be able to show good 
cause why the judgment should not be pronounced against 
him. (Pen. Code, §§ 1200, 1201 j see People v. Sarazzawski, 
27 Ca1.2d 7, 18 [161 P.2d 934] j People v. Hawthorne, 63 Cal. 
App.2d 262, 264 [146 P.2d 517] j People v. Megladdery, 40 
Cal.App.2d 748 [106 P.2d 84] j People v. Prudencio, 93 Cal. I 
App. 241, 246 [269 P. 698].) He may be able to show that 
there is good cause to believe that he is insane (Pen. Code, 
§ 1201(1) ; see People v. Jackson, 105 Cal.App.2d 811, 814-
815 [234 P.2d 261]), or that there is good cause to order a 
new trial (Pen. Code, §§ 1201(2), 1181),· or that there is 
good cause to grant a motion in arrest of judgment: (Pen. 
Code, §§ 1201 (2), 1185.) If judgment is pronounced in his 
absence, he is deprived of these rights. 
Some states hold that the right of an accused. to be present 
·In the present case, however, the fact that petitioner made a motion 
~or a new trial following his conviction in 1950 would deprive the trial 
. eourt of jurisdiction to entertain a second motion for a new trial at 
, the time of pronouncement of judgment. (People v. Martin, 199 Cal. 
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in court when jullgment is pronounced against him· does not 
include the right to have counsel present at that time. 
(See 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1574a.) [8] In this state, 
however, it has been held that an arraignment for judgment 
is a "criminal prosecution" within the meaning of article 
I, section 13, and that an accused therefore has the right to 
counsel at the time of pronouncement of judgment. (People 
v. Fields, 88 Cal.App.2d 30, 33 [198 P.2d 104].) [9] The 
Fields case involved an appeal and is thus not directly in 
point, but we have concluded that a judgment pronounced 
in the absence of counsel is also vulnerable to attack by 
habeas corpus. It would be anomalous to hold that a de-
fendant's personal presence is so important that he may set 
aside the judgment on collateral attack and yet to hold that 
the constitutional right to counsel is not of equal importance. 
A defendant's presence gives him an opportunity to show 
legal cause why judgment should not be pronounced against 
him. The average defendant, however, would be helpless to 
establish such cause without the aid of counsel. (See In re 
Janus, 38 Ca1.2d 302, 309 [240 P.2d 596], and cases cited 
therein.) Moreover, a defendant has the right to appeal from 
the judgment. (Pen. Code, § 1237; In re Davis, 37 Ca1.2d 
872, 875 [236 P.2d 579].) When judgment is pronounced in 
the absence of counsel, there is danger that the defendant 
might allow the time for notice of appeal to run in ignorance 
of his rights, and thus lose his opportunity to obtain review 
of the judgment. (Rules on Appeal, rule 31; see Peopl8 v. 
Slobodiion, 30 Ca1.2d 362,365 [181 P.2d 868] ; People v. Lewis, 
219 Cal. 410, 413-414 [27 P.2d 73].) 
The attorney general contends that the Fields case is in 
conflict with three earlier cases. (People v. Henry, 86 Cal. 
App.2d 785, 790 [195 P.2d 478] ; People v. Hawthorne, 63 
Cal.App.2d 262, 266 [146 P.2d 517] ; People v. Swift, 140 Cal. 
App. 7 [34 P.2d 1041].) In the Swift case the defendant 
was represented by counsel at the time of pronouncement of 
judgment. In the Henry and Hawthorne cases the defend-
ants were personally present at the time judgment was en-
tered, but it cannot be ascertained from the opinions whether 
they were represented by counsel. The only question pre-
sented to the courts in those cases, however, was the effect 
of the failure of the trial court to arraign the defendants for 
judgment pursuant to Penal Code section 1200, a question 
not raised by petitioner in the present case. 
[10] The trial court did not inform petitioner that he had 
) 
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a right to counsel. It did not ask him if he had any legal 
cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against 
him. It made no attempt to ascertain if he understood the 
pleas and defenses available under section 1201 of the Penal 
Code. The report of the probation officer is in the record and 
shows that petitioner has only a fifth grade education and 
is of "dull mentality." His failure to request counsel cannot 
therefore be amplified into a waiver of his right to counsel. 
(In t'e .James, supra, 38 Cal.2d 302, 313; People v. (Jhesser, 
29 Ca1.2d 815, 824 [178 P.2d 761] ; cf. In re Tedford, 31 Cal. 
2d 693, 695 [192 P.2d 3] ; In re Jingles, 27 Cal.2d 496, 498 
[165 P.2d 12].) 
[l1a] Petitioner has requested that he be "restored to 
liberty" if the writ is granted. Nothing in his petition or 
the record, however, shows that there is any defect in the 
adjudication of guilt. The error in the pronouncement of 
judgment does not require either his release or a new trial. 
(In re b[c(Joy, 32 Cal.2d 73, 77 [194 P.2d 531] ; In, re Mize, 
11 Cal.2d 22, 26-27 [77 P.2d 472] ; People v. Fields, 88 Cal. 
App.2d 30, 33 [198 P.2d 104] ; State ex rel. Shetsky v. Utec1tt, 
228 :Minn. 44, 54 [36 N.W.2d 126] ; Staples v. (Jommonwealth, 
140 Va. 583, 587 [125 S.E. 319J.) [12] The delay since revoca-
tion of probation has not caused the trial court to lose jurisdic-
tion to pronounce a valid judgment. (See People v. W~1liams, 
24 Cal.2d 848, 854 [151 P.2d 244].) If petitioner should again 
be sentenced to prison, his confinement based upon the invalid 
. judgment will be credited upon the new commitment. (Pen. 
Code, § 2900.1.) 
[Ub] The petitioner is discharged from the custody of the 
authorities at the California Institution for Men at Chino and 
[ committed to the custody of the sheriff of Los Angeles County i with directions that petitioner be arr.aigned for pronouncement I of judgment in accord with this opinion. 
t. - Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and 
%' Spence, J., concurred. 
;.0 CARTER, .T.-I concur in the conclusion reached but since 
the holding of the majority is based in part upon In re Davis, 
~ 37 Cal.2d 872 [236 P.2d 579], in which I dissented, I with-
~. hold my approval from the portion of the decision of the 
court in this case which is supported by what I believe to be 
... an erroneous holding in In re Davis, supra. 
